

ECM TECHNIQUES GENERATION



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Form SF298 Citation Data

Report Date <i>("DD MON YYYY")</i> 01041997	Report Type N/A	Dates Covered (from... to) <i>("DD MON YYYY")</i>
Title and Subtitle ECM Techniques Generation		Contract or Grant Number
		Program Element Number
Authors		Project Number
		Task Number
		Work Unit Number
Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) ASC/ENAD Wright-Patterson AFB, OH		Performing Organization Number(s)
Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)		Monitoring Agency Acronym
		Monitoring Agency Report Number(s)
Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited		
Supplementary Notes		
Abstract		
Subject Terms "IATAC COLLECTION"		
Document Classification unclassified		Classification of SF298 unclassified
Classification of Abstract unclassified		Limitation of Abstract unlimited
Number of Pages 77		

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 074-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 4/1/97	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Briefing	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE ECM Techniques Generation			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) John E. Geise				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) IATAC Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center 3190 Fairview Park Drive Falls Church VA 22042			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Defense Technical Information Center DTIC-IA 8725 John J. Kingman Rd, Suite 944 Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) The goal of this session is to provide a comprehensive look at functional areas of ECM system and trade-off considerations, i.e. apertures, receivers/processors, counter/measurer techniques generators, and high power sources. Also to a provide comprehensive look at techniques, i.e. generators, system architectures, interaction between jamming and radar processing, trades & drivers, and processes/tools				
14. SUBJECT TERMS EW			15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT None	

INTRODUCTION



GOAL OF SESSION

- . PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF ECM SYSTEM AND TRADE-OFF CONSIDERATIONS
 - . APERTURES
 - . RECEIVERS/PROCESSORS
 - . COUNTERMEASURE/TECHNIQUES GENERATORS
 - . HIGH POWER SOURCES

GOAL OF TOPIC

- . PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT TECHNIQUES GENERATORS
 - . SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES
 - . INTERACTION BETWEEN JAMMING AND RADAR PROCESSING
 - . TRADES & DRIVERS
 - . PROCESSES/TOOLS

AGENDA



SURVIVABILITY FACTORS

ECM SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

- RANGE
- VELOCITY
- ANGLE



MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES

COUNTERMEASURES WRAP-UP

ECM ANALYSIS - TOOLS AND PROCESSES

AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY FACTORS

(EC IS A CONTRIBUTOR TO A/C SURVIVABILITY)




EWRESPONSE TO ENEMY AIR DEFENSE




THREATIADS

ECFORCEELEMENTS



ENGAGEMENT PROCESS



SURVIVABILITY FACTORS



JAM TO SIGNAL RATIO (J/S) - SELF SCREENING

- RATIO OF JAMMER POWER TO TARGET RETURN POWER

$J/S = f(\text{ERP, RANGE, TARGET SIGNATURE, BANDWIDTH MATCH})$

$$J/S = \frac{P_J G_J}{P_T G_T} \cdot \frac{4\pi R^2}{1} \cdot \frac{\sigma}{1} \cdot \frac{B_T}{B_J} \quad \text{for } B_J \geq B_T$$

WHERE:

P_J = Jammer TX Power

G_J = Jammer TX Antenna Gain

P_T = Radar TX Power

G_T = Radar Antenna Gain

R = Range - Jammer to Radar

σ = Target Radar Cross Section

B_T = Radar Bandwidth

B_J = Jammer Bandwidth

AGENDA



SURVIVABILITYFACTORS



ECMSYSTEMARCHITECTURES

RADARCOUNTERMEASURES


- RANGE
- VELOCITY
- *ANGLE

MISSILECOUNTERMEASURES

COUNTERMEASURESWRAPUP

ECMANALYSIS-TOOLSANDPROCESSES

GENERIC ECM SUITE MODEL



ECM SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES




CONSTANT GAIN

- LINEAR AMPLIFICATION OF INPUT SIGNAL
- ELECTRONIC GAIN < ISOLATION
- 4LLOWS R_x TO "LOOK OVER" JAMMING TO SEE THREAT
- PROVIDES CONSTANT J/S UNTIL T_x SATURATION
THEN DEGRADES WITH RANGE (-6dB/OCTAVE)

CONSTANT POWER

- POWER SHARING vs MULTIPLE SIGNALS
- T_x OPERATES AT OR NEARSATURATION REGARDLESS OF INPUT SIGNAL LEVEL
- ELECTRONIC GAIN MAY BE GREATER THAN ISOLATION
- TYPICALLY, T_x MUST SHUT DOWN FOR R_x TO SEE THREAT
- J/S DECREASES WITH RANGE (-6dB/OCTAVE)

ECM SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES



ECM SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES



TRADES & DRIVERS - CONSTANT GAIN

- ANTENNA ISOLATION
 - LARGE ENOUGH TO COVER TARGET RETURN TO ACCEPTABLE RANGE
 - SUFFICIENT GAIN MARGIN TO ALLOW RECEIVER TO ACQUIRE / MAINTAIN TRACK OF THREAT RADAR
 - DIFFICULT TO COVER LARGE CROSS SECTION TARGETS
- * LOOK-OVER-GAIN MARGIN ALLOWS RECEIVER TO SEE THREAT SIGNAL IN PRESENCE OF JAMMING
- LOOK THROUGH - SERVICE OF SPECIALIZED RECEIVERS
- SYSTEM LOSSES (CABLES, COUPLERS ETC.) WILL DEGRADE DETECTION RANGE AND J/S
- COHERENCY MAINTAINED BY MEMORIZATION/REPEATING INCOMING SIGNAL

ECM SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES



TRADES & DRIVERS - CONSTANT POWER

- ANTENNA ISOLATION - MUST SHUT OFF Tx ON RECEIVE
- LOOKTHROUGH
 - ENOUGH TO ALLOW RECEIVERS TO ACQUIRE/MAINTAIN TRACK
 - SMALL ENOUGH TO PRECLUDE JAMMING **DEGRADATION**
- CHOP
 - *TIMING
 - SPECTRAL SPREADING
- SYSTEM LOSSES (CABLES, COUPLERS, ETC.) WILL DEGRADE RANGE AND J/S
- DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE/MAINTAIN COHERENCY

SYSTEM APPROACH - COMBINE CONSTANT GAIN /POWER MODES

- **CONSTANTPOWERMODEVS .NON-COHERENT THREATS**
- **CONSTANTGAINMODEVSCOHERENTTHREATS**

AGENDA



SURVIVABILITY FACTORS

ECM SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES

RADAR COUNTERMEASURE TECHNIQUES




- RANGE
- VELOCITY
- ANGLE

MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES

COUNTERMEASURE SWRAPUP

ECM ANALYSIS- TOOLS AND PROCESSES

BASIC RADAR



RADAR COUNTERMEASURES



NON-COHERENT-PULSE RADAR CHARACTERISTICS

- **RANGE TRACKING**
- **PHASE INFORMATION NOT PRESERVED**
- **HIGH PEAK POWER**
 - **GROUND BASED (~ 120 dBm)**
 - **AIRBORNE (~ 100 dBm)**
- **LOW DUTY CYCLE (< 1%)**
 - **MAY HAVE NARROW PW (< 1 USEC)**
 - **LOW PRF (<SK PPS)**
- **INSTANTANEOUS BANDWIDTH (MEGAHERTZ)**



RADAR COUNTERMEASURES




RANGE TECHNIQUES VS PULSE RADAR

- **BROADBAND NOISE**
 - **BARRAGE (BARR)**
 - **SWEPT SPOT (SSN)**
- **POWER MANAGED NOISE**
 - **RANGE GATED NOISE (RGN)**
- **PULSE REPEATER**
 - **RANGE GATE PULL OFF (RGPO)**
- **POWER MANAGED TRANSPONDER**
 - **RANGE GATE PULL IN & OUT (RANRAP)**
 - **RANGE FALSE TARGETS (RFT)**



SPLIT GATE RANGE TRACKER





NOISE TECHNIQUES




RANGE GATE PULLOFF TIME SEQUENCE



R⁰ NGE F⁰ LSE T⁰ RGETS



CUES



- F² Z Z B² LL



- MOUSE UNDER THE RUG



- F² O² T² P O O C²



- J/S DIFFERENCES



- RATE OF SEPARATION



RADAR COUNTER MEASURES



TRADES & DRIVERS - RANGE TECHNIQUES

. NOISE

- . FREQUENCY SET ON - ACCURACY & SETTLING TIME
- . BANDWIDTH MATCHING
- . LOOK THROUGH RATE

. REPEATER

- . CONSTANT GAIN - ISOLATION/GAIN VERSUS TARGET RCS
- . TIME DELAY THROUGH SYSTEM
- . CONSTANT POWER - CHOP RATE/SPECTRAL SPREADING

. TRANSPONDER

- . SYSTEM COMPLEXITY
- . SIGNAL SORTING/TRACKING
- . FREQUENCY/TIME SET ON ACCURACY
- . LOOK THROUGH RATE

AGENDA



SURVIVABILITYFACTORS

ECMSYSTEMARCHITECI ' URES

RADARCOUNTERMEASURESTECHNIQUES





- RANGE
- *VELOCITY
- ANGLE

MISSILECOUNTERMEAURES

COUNTERMEASURESWRAPUP

ECMANALYSIS-TOOLSANDPROCESSES

BASIC RADAR




RADAR COUNTERMEASURES



DOPPLER RADAR CHARACTERISTICS


- DOPPLER SHIFT (VELOCITY) TRACKING
- COHERENT RADAR - PHASE INFORMATION PRESERVED
 - STABLE FREQUENCY SOURCE
 - PHASE DETECTOR
- HIGH AVERAGE POWER
 - GROUND BASED (~ 110 dBm)
 - AIRBORNE (~ 90 dBm)
- MEDIUM TO HIGH DUTY CYCLE ($5 < DC < 40$ % TO CW)
 - WIDE PW ($1 \text{ USEC} < PW < CW$)
 - MEDIUM - HIGH PRF (10K-300 K PPS TO CW)
- NARROW INSTANTANEOUS BANDWIDTH (KILOHERTZ)
 - DEPENDS ON COHERENT INTEGRATION OF TARGET RETURN
 - SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASE NOISE & NON-COHERENT JAMMING EFFECTS

Clutter Spectrum



0892006 01 0547

TRUE DOPPLER PROFILE





RADAR COUNTERMEASURES





VELOCITY TECHNIQUES VS DOPPLER RADAR

- REPEATER
 - VELOCITY GATE PULL-OFF (VGPO)
 - VELOCITY FALSE TARGETS (VFT)
- TRANSPONDER (DRFM TECHNIQUES)
 - COMBINED RANGE/VELOCITY PULL-OFF
 - RANGE/VELOCITY FALSE TARGETS (R/V FT)


COHERENT AND NON COHERENT CHARACTERISTICS




COHERENT RADAR CHARACTERISTICS




VELOCITY GATE PULL OFF TIME SEQUENCE




VELOCITY FALSE TARGETS



COMBINED RGPO/VGPO



COMBINED RGPO/VGPO



RW49COM D-173

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES



TRADES & DRIVERS - VELOCITY ECM

- PRESERVATION OF COHERENCY
 - ISOLATION/GAIN/ GAIN MARGIN
 - STABILITY OF UP/DOWN CONVERSION HARDWARE
 - MEMORY UPDATE RATES
- POWER (J/S)
 - BANDWIDTH MATCH
 - MODULATION LOSS
 - MULTIPLEXING LOSS (6dB PER ADDITIONAL THREAT)
- JAM CUES
 - SPECTRAL PURITY
 - QUANTIZATION NOISE/SPURS
 - UP/DOWN CONVERSION SPURS
 - JEM LINES

AGENDA



SURVIVABILITY FACTORS

ECM SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

- RANGE
- VELOCITY
- * ANGLE




MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES .

COUNTERMEASURES VV RAPUP

ECM ANALYSIS - TOOLS AND PROCESSES

BASIC RADAR




RADAR COUNTERMEASURES



ANGLE TRACKING CHARACTERISTICS

- . AZIMUTH/ELEVATION TRACKING IN ADDITION TO RANGE AND/OR VELOCITY
- . UTILIZES ANTENNA BEAM SHAPE FOR ANTENNA POINTING
- . USE RANGE OR DOPPLER (BINS/GATES/CELLS) TO REDUCE NOISE, CLUTTER, JAMMING, INTERFERENCE TO TRACK ONLY SIGNAL
- . SINGLE ANGLE CHANNEL
 - . USES SINGLE ANTENNA BEAM
 - . TARGET POSITION - RETURN @ MAXIMUM AMPLITUDE
 - . SUSCEPTIBLE TO AMPLITUDE MODULATION ECM
 - . ACTIVE/PASSIVE TRACK WHILE SCAN (**TWS**), CONICAL/SEQUENTIAL SCAN
- . MULTIPLE ANGLE CHANNELS (MONOPULSE)
 - . COMPARES MULTIPLE ANTENNA BEAMS
 - . TARGET POSITION - WHERE ANGLE ERROR IS ZERO
 - . NULLIFIES CONVENTIONAL AM
 - . SUSCEPTIBLE TO MORE SOPHISTICATED TECHNIQUES

THE ANTENNA PROVIDES ANGLE MEASUREMENT



BEAMWIDTH

$$\theta_{3\text{ dB}} \propto \frac{\lambda}{d} = \frac{\text{WAVELENGTH}}{\text{ANT DIAMETER}}$$

AT X-BAND

$$\theta_{3\text{ dB}} \approx \frac{85^\circ}{d}$$

(FOR TAPERED ILLUM)

$$\theta_{3\text{ dB}} \approx \frac{70^\circ}{d}$$

(FOR UN-TAPERED)





RADAR COUNTERMEASURES






ANGLE ECM TECHNIQUES

- AMPLITUDE MODULATION
 - INVERSE GAIN
 - INVERSE CONICAL SCAN
 - SWEPT SQUARE WAVE
- MONOPULSES
 - POLARIZATION
 - CROSS-EYE
 - CHAFF

INVERSE GAIN VS TRACK-WHILE-SCAN




SCAN RELATED AMPLITUDE MODULATION VS CONICAL SCAN



CONICAL SCAN

TARGET




TARGET OFF AXIS

POSITION A

AXIS OF
ROTATION

POSITION B

TARGET




TARGET ON AXIS


POSITION A

POSITION B

RECEIVED ECM AND SKIN




SWEPT AM VS PASSIVE SCAN



Radar Receive Scan

60 Hz



ECM

30 Hz

50 Hz

60 Hz



N

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES





TRADES & DRIVERS - AMPLITUDE MODULATION

- . TECHNIQUE GENERATOR COMPLEXITY
- . DETECTION & TRACKING
 - . SIGNAL AMPLITUDE
 - . SCAN RATE & PHASE
 - . DEPTH OF MODULATION
 - . MONITORING OF SIGNAL AMPLITUDE (FOR JOG DETECT)
- . MODULATION
 - . SCAN FREQUENCY SET-ON ACCURACY
 - . PHASE SET-ON ACCURACY
 - . DUTY CYCLE
 - . DEPTH OF MODULATION

MONOPULSE




- FOUR SIMULTANEOUSLY RECEIVE BEAMS.
- ANGLE ERRORS DERIVED FROM INSTANTANEOUS BEAM COMPARISON
 - AZIMUTH ERROR = $(A + D) - (B + C)$
 - ELEVATION ERROR = $(A + B) - (C + D)$TIME INDEPENDENT
- TARGET BORESIGHTED WHEN $A=B=C=D$




MONOPULSE IMPACTS




SCANNING RADAR



MONOPULSE RADAR



POLARIZATION







UNCLASSIFIED

POLARIZATION CHARACTERISTICS IN A MONOPULSE ANTENNA


BASIC
ANTENNA
PATTERN




PRINCIPAL POLARIZATION




CROSS POLARIZATION



MONOPULSE
ANTENNA
(ONE PLANE)



SUM & DIFFERENCE
PATTERNS



UNCLASSIFIED

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES




TRADES & DRIVERS - POLARIZATION ANGLE ECM

- THREAT VULNERABILITY
 - MONO-STATIC vs BISTATIC
 - CROSS-POLARIZATION RESISTANCE
- SYSTEM COMPLEXITY - SPECIALIZED Rx/Tx
 - POLARIZATION UPDATE RATE
 - LOOKTHROUGH
 - MULTIPATH
 - POLARIZATION SET ON ACCURACY (PURITY)
- OFTEN DEPENDENT ON RANGE OR VELOCITY PULL TO ACHIEVE INFINITE J/S


CROSS-EYE



NORMAL RADAR TRACKING



CROSS-EYE



**RADAR TRIES
TO ALIGN
ANTENNA
WITH
TILTED PHASE
FRONT**



RADAR COUNTERMEASURES



TRADE & DRIVERS - CROSS-EYE ANGLE ECM

- RADAR - MONOSTATIC vs BISTATIC
- SYSTEM COMPLEXITY - SPECIALIZED Rx/Tx
 - PHASE MATCHING
 - SYSTEM DELAYS
- OFTEN DEPENDENT ON RANGE OR VELOCITY PULL TO ACHIEVE INFINITE J/S

SELF PROTECTION CHAFF



RW648E DKJ170

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES



TRADE & DRIVERS - CHAFF ANGLE ECM

- **DISPENSE RATE**
- **BLOOM RATE/SIZE**
- **VELOCITY OF DIPOLES VS DOPPLER TRACKERS**
- **EFFECTIVE CROSS SECTION OF CHAFF CLOUD**
- **WEATHER**
- **AIRCRAFT MANEUVER**

AGENDA



SURVIVABILITYFACTORS

ECMSYSTEMARCHITECTURES

RADARCOUNTERMEASURES

- *RANGE
- VELOCITY
- ANGLE




MISSILECOUNTERMEASURES

COUNTERMEASURESWRAPUP

ECMANALYSIS-TOOLSANDPROCESSES

COMMAND MISSILE GUIDANCE



MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES



COMMAND GUIDED WEAPON JAMMING APPROACH:

- ATTACK MULTIPLE ASPECTS OF WEAPON SYSTEM
- FALSE TARGET POSITION VERSUS TARGET TRACK RADAR (TTR)
 - RANGE - FALSE TARGETS (RFT/RANRAP), MASKING - NOISE
 - ANGLE - ANGLE ERROR - AM, XPOL

DOWN LINK JAMMING:

- FALSE MISSILE POSITION VERSUS MISSILE TRACKING RECEIVER
 - RANGE - FALSE RANGE POSITION
 - ANGLE - LINE OF SIGHT WITH TARGET, NOT WITH MISSILE
 - DENY MISSILE TRACK
- COMMAND LINK - (UPLINK)
 - ISSUES INCORRECT FLIGHT COMMANDS TO MISSILE
 - MISSILE FLYS TO WRONG RANGE/ANGLE FOR INTERCEPT


MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES




TRADES & DRIVERS - COMMAND GUIDED MISSILE CM (DOWN LINK JAMMING)

- REQUIRES HIGH POWER TO BE EFFECTIVE
 - JAM TO BEACON (J/B) RATIO
 - APRIORI KNOWLEDGE OF BEACON FREQUENCY OR ABILITY TO MEASURE BEACON FREQUENCY
- REQUIRES HIGH DUTY CYCLE FROM JAMMER
 - @ 'MULTIPLE ECM PULSES FOR EACH RADAR PULSE
 - TIME/FREQUENCY MULTIPLEXING TO COVER UNCERTAINTY

SEMI-ACTIVE MISSILE GUIDANCE SYSTEM



TERRAIN B° UNCE



RW60TER DK6170 5.2

MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES




TRADES & DRIVERS - TERRAIN BOUNCE MISSILE CM

- . **ATTACKS SEMI-ACTIVE AND ACTIVE MISSILES**
- . THREAT CAPABILITY - TWO TARGET PROCESSING/CCM
- $(J/S)_{\text{DIRECT}}$ VS $((J)_{\text{INDIRECT}} / (J+S)_{\text{DIRECT}})$
- . POWER DENSITY DIMISHES WITH ALTITUDE
- . ANTENNA TRADES
 - . MAINLOBE GAIN/BEAMWIDTH
 - . DEPRESSION ANGLE
 - . SIDELobe SUPPRESSION
- . TERRAIN REFLECTIVITY
 - . VARIES WITH TERRAIN TYPE
 - . DOPPLER SPREAD
 - . TIME DELAY



Affordable, Effective Countermeasures Against Critical RF Threats



ON-BOARD SYSTEMS

- DECOY SYSTEM
 - CONTROLLER
 - POWER SUPPLY
 - LAUNCHER

THREAT WARNING SYSTEM
DIRECTION OF ARRIVAL

- TECHNIQUES GENERATOR
 - RECEIVE
 - MODULATE
 - RF - OPTIC CONVERSION

DECOY TOW LINE

- POWER TRANSMISSION
- CONTROLLER - DECOY COMMUNICATIONS

- OPTICAL SIGNAL TRANSMISSION

OFF-BOARD DECOY

- SELF-CONTAINED REPEATER
 - RECEIVE
 - MODULATE
 - AMPLIFY
 - TRANSMIT

- DECOY TRANSPONDER
 - OPTIC - RF CONVERSION
 - AMPLIFY
 - TRANSMIT

MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES



TRADES & DRIVERS - TOWED DECOY MISSILE CM

- THREAT CAPABILITY
 - TWO TARGET PROCESSING CCM'S
 - LETHAL RADIUS
 - FUSING
 - SALVO SHOT
- AIRCRAFT SIGNATURE TO BE PROTECTED
- * GEOMETRY - ZONES OF NO PROTECTION
- TOWED DECOY AERODYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS
 - LAUNCH CLEARANCE
 - DEPLOYMENT / REDEPLOYMENT SPEED / BRAKING
 - REEL OUT / INCAPABILITY
 - FLIGHT STABILITY
 - LINE LENGTH / DROOP
- QUANTITY TO BE CARRIED

MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES



TRADES & DRIVERS - REPEATER TOWED DECOY

- SIMPLE ARCHITECTURE
- LIMITED ELECTRONIC GAIN - DUE TO ISOLATION OF CLOSELY SPACED TRANSMIT AND RECEIVE ANTENNAS
- DOPPLER MODULATION RESULTS IN SPECTRAL SPREADING & LOSS OF J/S
- THREAT RANGE RESOLUTION LIMITS TOW LINE LENGTH
 - GEOMETRY
 - DELAY
- POTENTIAL BEACONING TO UNWANTED THREATS FOR BROADBAND OPERATION

MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES



TRADES & DRIVERS - TRANSPONDER TOWED DECOY

- COMPLEX ARCHITECTURE
 - RECEIVE/TECHNIQUE GENERATION ON BOARD
 - REMOTE TRANSMITTER
- ELECTRONIC GAIN- HIGHER DUE TO WIDE ANTENNA SEPARATION
- LONGER TOW LENGTH POSSIBLE
- GEOMETRY ISSUES REMAIN
- COMPLEX MODULATIONS POSSIBLE
 - DOPPLER
 - RANGE TECHNIQUES - OVERCOME DELAYS
- MINIMIZES BEACONING - USE OF THREAT SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES

AGENDA



SURVIVABILITYFACTORS

ECMSYSTEMARCHITECKJRES

RADARCOUNTERMEASURESTECHNIQUES

- *RANGE
- VELOCITY
- *ANGLE

MISSILECOUNTERMEASURES

WCOUNTERMEASURESWRAPUP

ECMANALYSIS-TOOLSANDPROCESSES

COUNTERMEASURES - WRAP UP



REQUIREMENTS AND STRATEGY DERIVED FROM:

- . THREAT ENVIRONMENT
 - . IADS - C3 VULNERABILITY
 - . SIGNAL DENSITY
 - . RADAR CAPABILITIES (RANGE, DOPPLER, ANGLE)
 - . MISSILE CAPABILITY (CG, SA, A)
- AIRCRAFT
 - . SIGNATURE
 - . FLIGHT ENVELOPE

COUNTERMEASURES GOALS

- . DELAY/NEGATE ALL STEPS OF RADAR/MISSILE ENGAGEMENT

COUNTERMEASURES-WRAP UP



SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

- . **ISOLATION/SYSTEM** GAIN VS TARGET RETURN
- . CONSTANT GAIN VS CONSTANT POWER
- **LOOKTHROUGH,LOOKOVER,CHOP**
- . COHERENCY

COUNTERMEASURES TECHNIQUES

- . COUNTER RANGE, VELOCITY, AND ANGLE
- RADAR OPERATION & ECCM'S
- @**OPERATOR**

. *MISSILE VULNERABILITIES AND TECHNIQUES*

- . COMMAND GUIDED
- . ACTIVE / SEMI-ACTIVE

AGENDA



SURVIVABILITY FACTORS

ECMSYSTEMARCHITECTURES

RADARCOUNTERMEASURES

- RANGE
- VELOCITY
- ANGLE

MISSILECOUNTERMEASURES

COUNTERMEASURESWRAPUP



ECMANALYSIS-TOOLSANDPROCESSES

EC ANALYSIS - TOOLS AND PROCESSES



EC ANALYSIS TASK

- **EW ENVIRONMENT - COMPLEX**
- **COUNTLESS FACTORS AFFECT EC OUTCOME**
- **MULTIPLE TOOLS AVAILABLE FOR EC TECHNIQUE ANALYSIS**

**WHICH TOOL DO I CHOOSE TO HELP ANALYZE
ECM TECHNIQUES PERFORMANCE?**

DON'T DEFINE THE PROBLEM TO FIT THE TOOL

THE TOOL MUST FIT THE PROBLEM


EC ANALYSIS - TOOLS AND PROCESSES





FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN TOOL CHOICE

- . **UNDERSTAND WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO QUESTION BEING ASKED**
 - **NOT FEASIBLE TO CAPTURE ALL REAL WORLD VARIABLES IN A MODEL - ASSUMPTIONS ARE INHERENT - WHAT ARE THEY?**
 - . **CHALLENGE - SELECT & ADEQUATELY TREAT PERTINENT VARIABLES IN THE QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED**
- . **CHECK TO SEE IF IT IS THE RIGHT TOOL**
 - . **MODEL MUST MATCH THE PHYSICS OF THE ISSUE**
 - . **USE HARD THREAT DATA FOR VARIABLES THAT ARE THREAT SENSITIVE**
 - . **REPRESENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA IN THE TOOL MUST ADEQUATELY SUPPORT ADDRESSING THE CRITICAL ISSUE**
- . **UNDERSTAND THE PEDIGREE OF THE TOOL**
 - . **SA-xx or MiG - zz NAMEPLATE - DOES NOT ENSURE FIDELITY**
 - . **WHAT ASPECTS OF TOOL HAVE HIGH FIDELITY?**


CONFIDENCE PROCESS/OUTPUTS




TARGET ENGAGEMENT



TARGET ENGAGEMENT MODEL




SUBSYSTEM RESPONSE DATA



SYSTEMRESPONSEDATA



Hardware Response (Green) vs. Simulation Response (Blue), Target (Red)



ECMANALYSIS-TOOLSANDPROCESSES



EC EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENTS

- HIGH DEGREE OF COMPLEXITY - NUMEROUS VARIABLES
- UNCERTAINTY IN INPUT DATA
- **LIMITATIONS & ASSUMPTIONS IN MODELS/TOOLS**

EC TOOLS DO NOT PROVIDE ANSWERS

EC TOOLS PROVIDE INSIGHT TO INFORMED ANALYSTS IF THE TOOL,
THE INPUT DATA, AND CONSTRAINTS ARE UNDERSTOOD